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Nationwide school choice and fixed per-student governmental funding provide incentives for 
Dutch schools to perform well. Roughly one third of Dutch pre-university schools are of 
catholic denomination. Acknowledging this widely available outside option to public and 
other schools, this paper considers the effect of catholic competition on non-catholic school 
performance in pre-university education. Employing data from central exit exams, a positive 
link between competition intensity and academic achievement is found. In addition to raising 
achievement, higher levels of competition are not associated with a deterioration of grading 
standards. Finally, (inverse) quantile regression estimates show no evidence of schools at the 
bottom of the achievement distribution being hurt by competition. 
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It is by no means a new discovery that there may be benecial eects of competition in the
market for education. Ever since Friedman (1955), economists have argued that school
choice in the form of vouchers would exert competitive pressure on school authorities which
in turn would lead them to provide higher school quality. On the downside, increased
choice could induce increased sorting by ability. This cream-skimming by the better
schools is often thought to leave the least able students amongst themselves. In addition
to being stuck in a bad school, they may thus be robbed of any positive peer eects they
may have experienced in a mixed-ability school.
There is rather extensive empirical evidence on the eects of school competition in North
America, yet this is not the case in Europe. Given the substantial institutional dier-
ences between the US and many European countries, further research is in order. This
paper lls this gap by considering the Dutch education system which is characterized
by centrally devised and graded school exit examinations and xed per-student funding
through the central government. In combination with unrestricted school choice which
has been in place ever since the early 20th century, this constitutes a system of nationwide
quasi-vouchers. Even though increasing interventions of the central government when it
comes to curricula and the size of teaching sta are sometimes criticized (Walford, 2000),
this institutional setup clearly complies with conceptions of a competitive school system
harbored by proponents of school choice. It thus makes for an interesting subject for
studying the implications of school competition.
1.1 The Link between School Quality and Competition
In the United States, each year a substantial share of the population relocates and sec-
ondary education is traditionally funded to a considerable degree by means of local prop-
erty taxes. This makes educational policies and their eects on households' locational
decisions a standard example of Tiebout's (1956) 'voting with the feet'. Indeed, research
has shown that households take school quality into account when choosing their place of
residence and they are willing to pay a premium for it, i.e. school quality is capitalized
in house prices.1
Whether school quality reacts to parents exercising the exit-option (or the threat thereof)
has been at the center of another strand of research. Predominantly, school quality is
measured in terms of academic achievement { i.e. test scores and graduation rates2 { and
the main explanatory variable is the intensity of competition in the relevant market. One
1Obviously, in a larger geographical context, there are many other variables such as job availability which
inuence residential patterns. Within a metro area, however, school quality has been shown to be closely
linked to house prices. See Black (1999), Weimer and Wolko (2001), Barrow (2002) and Bayer, Ferreira
and McMillan (2005). For evidence that these eects can also be found outside the United States, see
Cheshire and Sheppard (2003).
2Whether grades and the likes are a good measure of school quality is disputable. While certainly an
intriguing issue, the discussion is beyond the focus of this paper.
1reasonable indicator of competition would be the number of schools or school districts that
make up the choice set within a particular market. Alternatively, the Herndahl index of
concentration, which is closely related to the number of schools or districts can be used
(Martinez-Vazquez and Seaman 1985, Hoxby 2000). The percentage of students attending
private schools (Hoxby 1994) or the number of private schools is also often employed, as
these schools provide an outside option to public schools which may be too similar to
actually impose competitive pressure upon one another. Evidently, these measures are
all the more powerful when education markets are clearly dened geographically, thus
determining a household's choice set.
When employing competition measures, endogeneity issues need to be taken into account.
Picture a school district whose schools perform poorly. This district will be especially
prone to the initiation of private schooling, as there are more students who are unhappy
with the school they presently attend and this will add to the demand for alternatives.
Failure to acknowledge this mechanism may lead to an underestimation of the impact of
choice on achievement, as one may concurrently observe high degrees of competition and
low public school quality. In a similar fashion, the number of school districts may be a
function of school quality. Even though the endogeneity of competition has recently been
contested by Brasington (2005) and Rothstein (2007), at least testing for endogeneity is
necessary.
Empirical Evidence for the United States. Even though school choice continues
to be promoted as a means of ensuring that students receive a better education and
voucher programs are introduced or extended in the United States, the scientic evidence
on the eects of competition are far from being unambiguous. Using data from the
UTD Texas School Project, Hanushek and Rivkin (2003) dene metropolitan areas as
education markets. Competition is measured by a Herndahl index, which shows no
signicant connection to school quality. Marlow (1999) on the other hand nds a positive
impact on achievement in many of his specications, when competition is operationalized
through the use of a county-wide Herndahl index. Earlier, Marlow (1997) had already
stated positive eects of the number of available schools per student on SAT scores using
state-level data.3 Studies by Borland and Howsen (1993) and Zanzig (1997) only nd
eects up to a certain threshold level of competition. Geller, Sjoquist and Walker (2006)
cannot identify a signicant positive inuence of competition by private schools on test
scores in Georgia at all.
Most prominent in the public discourse are probably two studies by Hoxby (1994, 2000).
In the more recent paper she develops an index of competition based on the number of
school districts in a metropolitan area. The use of streams as an instrumental variable
for the number of districts leads her to the conclusion of a positive inuence of choice on
achievement. The earlier study also nds a positive eect, measuring competition as the
percentage of students in the market attending private schools. Here, the instruments are
the shares of the population associated with various religious denominations. An approach
3Schools per student or per capita is not a reasonable concept of competition when local education markets
are studied. Simply imagine a local education market which harbors few students or is sparsely populated
but has only one school. This would imply high levels of competition when in fact the school is a local
monopolist.
2similar to Hoxby (1994) is used by Dee (1998), Jepsen (1999) and Sander (1999). Even
though all three studies allow for endogeneity of competition, only Dee nds a signicant
positive link to levels of achievement. This lack of consensus in the literature is best
summarized in an extensive survey of studies on school choice by Beleld and Levin
(2002), who state that a mere third of the 25 empirical studies considered in their survey
nd signicantly positive eects of levels of competition on academic achievement.
Empirical Evidence for Other Countries. Possibly due to the assumption that
Tiebout-sorting is less prevalent in Europe, a large portion of the literature is concerned
with North America. Moreover, in a European context, education isn't typically funded
via local taxes, pointing to lower levels of Tiebout-style competition. However, there
are countries such as the Netherlands, which allow for school choice without changing
residential location, i.e. these countries do not set up mandatory catchment areas. When
the institutional feature of nationwide school choice is combined with xed per-student
governmental funding, the setup corresponds to an unrestricted nationwide system of
school vouchers. A voucher system compares favorably to traditional Tiebout competition,
as it enables low-income families who otherwise wouldn't be able to aord living in a good
school district to exercise the exit-option. It provides a level playing eld when it comes
to making educational choices, at least on a nancial level.
 Ahlin (2003) as well as Sandstr om and Bergstr om (2005) state that the abolition of
catchment areas in Sweden and the installation of a voucher scheme in 1992 led to positive
eects on achievement. Benecial eects are also found by Bradley, Johnes and Millington
(1999) for the United Kingdom. They dene competition as the number of schools in
the education market. Using urban density as a proxy for school competition, Gibbons
and Silva (2006) nd that students in densely populated areas in the UK fare better
academically. When it comes to the Netherlands, the research on school choice has been
largely descriptive (Patrinos 2000, De Vijlder 2000, Ritzen et al. 1997, and Dronkers
1995). Levin (2004) and Dronkers (2004) examine the eect of attending a catholic
school on academic performance. Both studies conclude that catholic schools generate
superior educational outcomes. Clearly, this does not say anything about the impact of
levels of competition on achievement. We should, however, take these results as ample
evidence that the real outside option to attending a non-catholic school in the Netherlands
is transferring to a catholic school rather than choosing another non-catholic one.
Given that the US evidence { which is inconclusive in any event { may not apply to
education systems in other countries and the rather thin literature on school choice in
Europe, this paper adds an important piece to the school choice puzzle. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains in further detail the motivation
for choosing the Netherlands as an object of examination. Data sources are described in
section 3, along with the general empirical strategy. Section 4 contains the main empirical
results. Benecial eects of competition on academic achievement are found and neither
various robustness checks nor the 2SLS estimations suggest any dierently. Section 5 uses
quantile regression (QR) and inverse/instrumental variable quantile regression methods
(IVQR) in order to determine whether anyone is hurt by school competition, despite the
positive eects that mean regression suggests. Section 6 concludes.
32 The Dutch Education System
In this section, a brief overview of the dierent types of schools in the Netherlands, the
organization of school leaving examinations and centralized funding is given.
2.1 Types of secondary schools
Dutch compulsory education encompasses twelve school years and starts with primary
education (Basisschool) at age ve. Primary education lasts eight years and is in most
cases completed with the taking of the CITO (Central Institute for Test Development)
End of Primary School Test, a standardized test supposed to help parents determine the
type of secondary education most suitable for their child.
Today, there are three types (opleidingen) of institutions in secondary education (Voort-
gezet Onderwijs, VO) among which parents may choose:
(i) Pre-vocational or middle level secondary education (Voorbereidend middelbaar beroep-
sonderwijs, VMBO) lasts four school years.
(ii) Senior or higher general secondary education (Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onder-
wijs, HAVO) amounts to ve years of schooling.
(iii) Pre-university education (Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs, VWO) en-
compasses six years of schooling and oers a choice of either the \Atheneum", where
neither Greek nor Latin is compulsory, or the \Gymnasium" which has obligatory
Greek and Latin lessons. The goal of VWO education is to enable students to take
up a university education; it is thus the highest form of secondary education in the
Dutch education landscape.
Most Dutch schools oer more than one of these opleidingen, and often one school will
provide access to all three kinds of secondary education. The analysis in this paper is
restricted to the pre-university branch, because it is assumed that parents and students
in higher branches make more use of the freedom to choose.4
2.2 Mandatory School Leaving Exams
Dutch students end their secondary schooling careers with the taking of central exam-
inations. These central exams (centraal examen) account for half the nal grade. The
4Denessen, Sleegers and Smit (2005) nd that with higher socioeconomic status, proximity as a reason
for a particular school choice becomes less important. Since the share of students from a lower status
background is lower in VWO than in other branches, this implies that in VWO more so than in other
branches parents will not just pick the school that is geographically most convenient.
4other half is determined via decentralised testing (schoolexamen). The centraal examen
are centrally arranged and graded by the testing agency CITO.5 All students of the same
opleiding are faced with identical questions and grading is done by CITO within 4 weeks'
time. An ocial body, appointed by the Ministry of Education, CEVO (Centrale exam-
encommissie vaststelling opgaven) establishes the norms for the central exams.6
2.3 School Choice and Centralized Funding
The demand side of the Dutch secondary education system is characterized by parents
enjoying unrestricted nationwide school choice. There are no catchment areas whatsoever
and schools can neither charge tuition nor easily decline students based on criteria such
as ability, thus leaving (at least theoretically) little room for cream-skimming.
Market entry barriers on the supply side are also low, as everyone in the Netherlands is
granted the right to set up a school, if he or she so desires. The Dutch government is
obliged to take care of school funding as soon as the number of enrolled students rises
above a certain number, regardless of denomination or other philosophies and views held
by the founders. A xed annual transfer from the central government is then being
triggered by every student enrolled in a particular institution of secondary education.
Furthermore, if a school's enrolment drops below a certain level, it can be shut down. As
a consequence of this institutional setup, 70% of Dutch secondary schools are non-public
schools.
Even though Walford (2000) criticizes increasing interventions of the central government
when it comes to curricula and the size of teaching sta, it is still obvious that this
education system complies with conceptions of a competitive school system harbored by
proponents of school choice. Hence, it makes for an interesting subject of studying the
implications of school choice.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data Sources
This section describes the general estimation approach used in testing the idea that schools
which are exposed to higher levels of competition respond by providing superior school
quality. It discusses various measures of school quality as well as competition. Further-
more, the possible endogeneity of the competition variable is addressed.
5For further information, go to: http://www.cito.nl/com assess ex/nat nal ex/eind fr.html
6In some subjects, no centralized testing occurs (e.g. physical education and arts). The analysis in this
paper is limited to subjects where standardized central exams are given.
53.1 Estimation approach
The data used in this paper comprises information on the graduating classes of 2002 and
2003.7 The fact that the competition variable hardly varies from one year to another
means that the focus of this paper is on cross-sectional analysis of the data. The im-
pact of competition on educational achievement is estimated using the following baseline
estimation equation:
Gij = Cij + Xi + Zj + "ij; (1)
where i denotes the individual VWO-school and j education markets (in the context
of this paper, this will typically be a municipality), Gij is the average centraal examen
grade at school-level, Cij is the level of competition faced by school i in market j, Xi is a
vector of control variables at the school level and Zj is a vector of control variables at the
local geographic (municipality) level. To allow for the possible correlation of "ij within
geographic areas considered, the model allows for clustering of the standard errors at the
municipality level.
3.2 Measuring Competition and Achievement
Two important questions have to be addressed before estimating the baseline equation:
(i) Which outcome measure is to be employed?
(ii) How should competition be measured?
Many measures come to mind when (i) is considered. This work uses school-level average
grades in the central exit examinations. Even though quality of education involves so
many more components than grades, they may well constitute one of the best available
measures of educational output as they are considerably easier to grasp and measure
than other aspects. These grades are determined by means of a central exam and central
grading, administered by an independent institute (CITO). This practice renders them
as close as one can get to an impartial measure of school quality, as long as one is willing
to accept that the central exam tests the skills that should be conveyed by a Dutch
secondary school. Since exams are mandatory, there is no worry about selection-bias,
either, as would be the case with voluntary tests such as the American SAT (Scholastic
Aptitude Test). Another variable that has often been used as an outcome are graduation
rates . While this variable is available, in the Dutch setting it seems inappropriate, as half
of the nal grade and thus the graduation rate is determined via decentralized testing. In
essence, this makes graduation rates (and standards) a choice variable for the individual
school.8
7Even though data on grades and some controls are available prior to 2001, due to a dierent system of
standardization, these exam outcomes cannot be compared to post-2000 grades. For the class of 2001,
some of the school level controls could not be obtained.
8On the setting of standards at the local level see Himmler and Schwager (2007).
6There are also numerous ways to capture the intensity of competition (ii). Probably
most common is the use of a Herndahl index of student enrollment, which measures the
fragmentation of the student population within a given education market. The Herndahl







where sij is the share of VWO-school i's students in the total number of VWO students
in market j.
An even more straightforward measure is the number of VWO-schools within an education
market, as choice ultimately is a question of the number of alternatives that are on oer.
Even in the presence of school districts, the problem with the above measures is that it
is a priori unclear what the geographical boundaries of an education market are. When
Tiebout-sorting within a metropolitan area is present, it is insucient to consider only
those institutions within the same school district as a schools's competition. Hence, it
makes more sense to count all schools within the metro area as competitors. The Dutch
system of school choice without the need to relocate aggravates the problem, as parents
can theoretically reside in Amsterdam and send their ospring to a school in a place as far
away as Maastricht. As attending a farther away school entails travel cost, it is reasonable
to assume that there are limits in terms of distance when it comes to the choice of school.9
Following Levin (2004), in this analysis it is assumed that the Dutch gemeenten constitute
the boundaries to an education market and the Herndahl index as well as the number
of VWO-schools are calculated at the gemeente level. It seems reasonable to assume that
people have some sort of attachment to the municipality where they reside and thus are
likely to choose among schools located in the same municipality. Since it is, however, not
necessary to attend a school within one's municipality of residence, the number of VWO-
schools within a 15km radius around the school in question is also used as a robustness
check.
One measure that does not carry with it the need to dene education markets is the
distance in kilometers to the nearest VWO-school. Here, the argument is that competition
increases in proximity as it becomes more feasible for students to transfer from one school
to another. Any positive (or negative, for that matter) eects of competition should then
be more pronounced when proximity is high.
In all of the above measures but the Herndahl index, only catholic schools will be treated
as competitors for the non-catholic schools. As Levin (2004) and Dronkers (2004) have
stated, catholic schools outperform other forms of schooling, even after controlling for
selection eects, making these schools all the more attractive. The reasoning then is that
when parents choose a school, the real outside option to public/protestant schooling is
a catholic school rather than another public or protestant school. It is also important
9Denessen, Driessena and Sleegers (2005) nd that among 17 reasons Dutch parents cited contributing
to the choice of their school, proximity ranked 5th. School quality was found to be the most important
reason for a particular choice.
7to notice that about 30% of all schools are catholic schools. This is a substantially
higher share than in most other countries, making opting into the catholic school sector
a possibility that is widely available.
Additionally, the eects of competition on the level of grade ination are considered.
It is often argued that an undesirable eect of competition may be that schools facing
competitive pressure will try to attract students by inating grades, that is, they will




ij denotes the average centraal examen grade and Gs
ij the average schoolexamen
grade in school i in district j. The setting of average grades Gc
ij is governed by the central
standard dened by a committee of experts. The setting of school grades Gs
ij on the other
hand is governed by locally dened standards. Under coinciding central and school specic
standards, one would expect Gs
ij = Gc
ij, because grading scales are identical in central and
school exams. An upward deviation of Gs
ij from Gc
ij then constitutes a local standard that
falls short of the central standard. If one is willing to accept that the centrally devised
standard is the \true" standard, this may be interpreted as grade ination.
The nal outcome variable considered is per-student spending, which is expected to drop
under competitive pressure as schools are forced to operate more eciently.10
3.3 Data Sources
The data employed in this analysis stems from six dierent sources. Data on catholic
population was provided by the Institute for Applied Research on Religion (KASKI) of
the Radboud University Nijmegen. School-level data concerning students' present and
(in an indirect measure) past performance along with personal traits such as social and
cultural status is taken from the Kwaliteitskaart Voortgezet Onderwijs (Quality Cards
for Secondary Education), issues 2002   2004. The Kwaliteitskaarten are published on a
yearly basis by the Netherlands Inspectorate of Education and contain gures on exami-
nation results as well as eciency measures for Dutch secondary schools. They are being
made available to parents and children via the internet in order to facilitate choosing
an appropriate secondary school. The school location information given in the Quality
Cards are geocoded at the actual street address level and a matrix of distances between
all schools is calculated.
The Kwaliteitskaarten dataset also provides school-level information on the number of
students, administrative form of the school (private/denominational/public), the school
branches that can be attended at the school, average class sizes, subject-level average
grades attained in school and central exams, the recommended type of secondary school
based on students' performance in primary education (i.e. students' entrance levels of
performance), the percentage of ethnic minority students, the percentage of students
receiving nancial support from the government ('study cost allowance').
10If parents take per student spending as an indicator of school quality, there may also be a counteracting
eect such that schools try to attract students by building a reputation of spending more money per
student.
8The dependent variable Gij for the central exam is obtained directly from the dataset,
whereas Gij for grade ination is constructed from the performance data of the 2003 and
2004 Kwaliteitskaarten. As the original Kwaliteitskaarten le reports school-level average
grades across subjects only for the central exam, the average school specic (Gs
ij) and
central (Gc
ij) grades covering all subjects are calculated by weighting the average school
and central grades in each subject with the number of students that have actually taken
part in the exams in that particular subject. Apart from some 'placebo regressions', the
empirical analysis will be restricted to the eect of catholic competition on the grades in
non-catholic schools.
Controls are added for other possible determinants of academic performance. The per-
centage of cultural minority (CUMI) students is dened as the share of students in a given
school branch who have a non-Dutch background.11 It is used along with the percentage
of students receiving study cost allowance as a proxy for low social status. These proxies
are used, as neither the Inspectorate nor the individual schools collect detailed data on
the students' or parents' socioeconomic status.
At the end of basisschool each student is given a non-binding advice by her teachers
as to which school branch is deemed appropriate in secondary education. Since grades
from primary education are not available and the advice will obviously be largely based on
grades in primary school, we add the advice as a control variable for the incoming students'
skill level. Above advice denotes the share of students attending a more demanding branch
than the one recommended, i.e. these students are in VWO, yet the given advice was for
HAVO { which is the lower school branch adjacent to VWO { at the most. Half above
advice denotes the percentage of students who did not get a clear VWO recommendation
but rather were ranked in between HAVO and VWO. The percentage of students in
ability-tracked classes in the rst and second year of secondary education and the average
class size from the Kwaliteitskaarten are also included. Ability-tracked in this context
means that students attend classes with students from their chosen branch { which is
VWO in the context of this paper { only, whereas non-tracked students attend classes
together with students from other (lower) branches. After the second year of secondary
education there are no mixed classes.
In addition to school level data, control variables which are available on the municipality
and postcode level are used. Specically, the Statusscore postcodegebieden is a postcode
level index of quality of life in a given area. It thus proxies for the students' social back-
ground. They are supplied by The Social and Cultural Planning Oce of the Netherlands
(SCP), a Dutch government agency. The status scores are calculated in 4 year intervals,
taking into account variables such as mean education, mean income, average rents etc.
Postcode areas that have a low social status are denoted with values greater than zero,
areas of higher status receive negative values. These scores are matched with the schools'
4-digit postcodes taken from the Kwaliteitskaarten. As they are updated every four years
only, postcodes are assigned the same values in both years. Data on per capita income,
the share of school aged children in the population, population density and the land area
11While `cumi' is an ocial term in the Netherlands and there is a law that species the requirements to
be considered part of a cultural minority, essentially these are students who themselves or whose parents
were born in Eastern Europe or Third World countries.
9at the gemeente level comes from Nederland regionaal, published by the Dutch Oce of
Statistics (CBS).
Since school-level nancial endowment as well as characteristics of the teaching sta might
inuence average grades and standard setting as well as per-student spending, data from
the series Onderwijs in Cijfers (OIC) is used in some of the estimations, too. Onderwijs
in Cijfers is published annually by the Dutch Ministry of Education and is intended to
provide school managers with information on the above mentioned matters. Variables
included in the estimations are the share of short and long term debt in the total annual
balance, the rate of student body growth or shrinkage, the rate of sta growth or shrinkage
and the share of the sta that are part-timers with less than 80% of a full teaching position.
However, data availability is a bit of a problem, as many variables are missing for a large
number of schools. Another problem is that the data is not reported at the school level
but rather for groups of schools.
Tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix display descriptive statistics for the variables used in
the estimation.
4 Estimation Results
As stated above, this work is concerned with the eect of catholic competition on non-
catholic schools.12 In all of what follows, a further distinction is made between fully
roman-catholic schools and schools that are only in part operated by the catholic church.
These partly catholic schools include all kinds of cooperations of the catholic church with
other organizations, such as catholic schools cooperating with private/public/protestant
schools. If not stated otherwise the competition variable is the number of catholic schools
in the municipality.13
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables Gij, Gij and per student spending are
shown in tables 1 for the pooled classes of 2002 and 2003, split up by catholic schools and
non-catholic schools. On average, grades awarded in central exams are slightly higher in
catholic schools. Even though the dierence is statistically signicant, it does not seem
very large, even for school-level averages.14
12non-catholic schools evidently include non-public schools which are not aliated with the catholic church,
such as protestant or private schools. These schools, neither operated by the catholic church nor public,
make up about half of the non-catholic schools.
13There is one exception: The towns of Hoek van Holland and Hoogvliet are administered by the municipal-
ity of Rotterdam, yet they are located rather far away from the actual city. The town Hoek van Holland is
30km away, while Hoogvliet is approximately 15km from Rotterdam. Both towns do not directly border
Rotterdam and other municipalities have to be traversed in order to reach Rotterdam. This can be seen
in gure 6 in the appendix. For these reasons, Hoek van Holland and Hoogvliet are treated as education
markets separate from Rotterdam.
14Keep in mind, though, that while individual grades range from 0 to 100, most school-level averages range
from 60 to 70.
10Grade ination on the other hand seems to be more prevalent in non-catholic schools, the
dierence in means is again statistically signicant. Average spending per student is also
higher in non-catholic schools. As schools can gain additional funds from the government
when they have a large share of minority students enrolled, no statements on eciency
can be made from this data without controlling for student body composition.
The means of central exam grades and grade dierences are signicantly dierent across
the groups for both denitions of catholic schools. In the end, however, it doesn't even
matter whether or not these dierences are signicant but rather it matters whether
students and their parents perceive catholic schools to be superior. From the data it also
seems that the pure roman-catholic schools outperform even the partly catholic schools,
yet parents may perceive the partly catholic schools mainly as 'catholic' and thus as an
alternative to the non-catholic schools. The competition variable which includes these
partly catholic schools may thus be the more appropriate one.
When it comes to the competition variables, table 2 shows that the average non-roman-
catholic school faces about one roman-catholic competitor, whereas the average non-
catholic school faces about 1.4 competitors. The maximum amount of competitors is ve.
As can be expected from the fact that Dutch municipalities are rather small in land area,
the number of competitors within 15km is much higher than when the education market
is dened at the municipality level. The larger competitor set of non-catholic schools also
goes with a shorter distance to the nearest catholic school; the Herndahl index ranges
from 0.06 which is indicative of a pretty competitive market to 1 for those municipalities
harboring one school only.
Table 1: Summary statistics, dependent variables.
(partly) catholic schools non (partly) catholic schools
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD di6= 0
Central grade 369 64:40 2:59 639 63:91 3:08 
Grade ination 369 4:39 2:17 639 5:08 2:81 
Per student spending 176 5880 1257 308 6032 1175 no
Roman-catholic schools non Roman-catholic schools
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD di6= 0
Central grade 275 64:63 2:41 733 63:89 3:07 
Grade ination 275 4:16 2:04 733 5:08 2:76 
Per student spending 129 5827 1305 355 6032 1166 
The upper part considers all schools that are in part catholic as competition, whereas the bottom part considers only fully
Roman-Catholic schools as competition.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Estimation results when the central grade is used as the outcome variable are presented in
table 3 for non-catholic schools15 and in table 4 for non-roman-catholic schools.16 Spec-
15Non-catholic schools are not even partly operated by the catholic church. The competition variable thus
includes schools that are only in part operated by the catholic church.
16Non-roman-catholic schools may be partly operated by the catholic church, yet they are not fully roman-
catholic. The competition variable thus includes only those schools that are fully operated by the catholic
church.
11Table 2: Summary statistics, competition variables.
non (partly) catholic schools
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
No. cath. schools gemeente 639 1:41 1:67 0 5
No. cath. schools 15km radius 639 4:96 4:11 0 15
km to (partly) cath. school 639 6:16 7:29 0:08 42:55
Herndahl gemeente 631 0:40 0:31 0:06 1
non Roman-catholic schools
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
No. cath. schools gemeente 733 0:97 1:33 0 5
No. cath. schools 15km radius 733 3:44 3:03 0 12
km to Roman-cath. school 733 12:23 17:41 0:15 86:66
Herndahl gemeente 725 0:42 0:32 0:06 1
The upper part considers all schools that are not even in part catholic schools, whereas the bottom part considers those
schools that are not Roman-Catholic schools.
ication (1) includes the number of competitors and a year dummy only. Whenever
municipality characteristics are added in column (2), the coecient on competition actu-
ally becomes positive and in the case of non-catholic schools signicant. Including school
level control variables in column (3) further increases the eect of competition. It can be
seen that the school level variables now pick up the eects from the municipality level
controls, all of which now turn insignicant. The control variables mostly point in the
theoretically expected direction. A high share of minority students and students whose
advice after basisschool deemed VWO too demanding lead to lower average grades. The
same goes for a high percentage of untracked students. Somewhat surprising is the highly
signicant positive coecient of class size. This could be due to the fact that Dutch
schools receive extra funding for low ability students. These funds are often used to lower
class size. In the end this means that smaller classes are a proxy of sorts for a high
number of underachieving students. The non-religious school dummy has a negative co-
ecient, indicating that among the non-catholic schools, those schools not aliated with
any religion perform even worse.17 Including school nance measures in column (4) does
not alter the results from column (3) much. The nancial variables do not add much in
terms of explanatory value, as only short term debt is even marginally signicant. This
is not too surprising, as these variables are reported at an aggregated level of groups of
schools. On the downside, many observations are lost due to the limited availability of
the nancial variables. To put the coecients into perspective, a one standard deviation
change in competition increases central exam grades by 0.15 (non-catholic schools) and
0.1 (non-roman-catholic schools) standard deviations, respectively. This is not a huge
eect, but according to Beleld and Levin (2002) in the range of what other studies nd.
Overall, it seems that competition has a small but signicant positive impact on central
exam grades.
17Alternatively, dummies for the specic denominations can be included. This leaves the results unchanged,
the only two signicant dummies are those for the non-catholic religious schools. The non-religious school
dummy thus captures the same eect. Similarly, including dummies for the Dutch dioceses (bisdommen)
does not signicantly reduce the estimated eect of competition.
12In order to retain as many observations as possible, from here on only specication (3) is
used, as the additional controls do not add much in terms of explanatory value yet they
signicantly reduce the sample size. In addition, we were unable to obtain information
from the Dutch authorities with regards to why so many observations are missing. It is
thus not clear on what criteria the smaller sample would be selected, i.e. whether schools
report their nancial data voluntarily. In that case, a selection model would have to be
estimated to obtain unbiased results.
4.1 Endogeneity of Competition
Another issue that has to be dealt with is the possible endogeneity of competition to
local school quality. That is, in an area where public school quality is low, demand for
alternative forms of schooling may be especially high, causing a downward bias in the
competition coecients estimated by OLS. To overcome this problem, 2SLS estimation
is employed, where the estimation equations are
Cij = 0 + Ij1 + Xi2 + Zj3 + uij (3)
and
Gij = 0 + 1Cij + Xi2 + Zj3 + "ij: (4)
The rst stage is given by (3) and the second stage by (4), where the denitions are as in
(1) and Ij is the set of instruments.
The instruments proposed are the number of catholics living in the education market
and its square. As catholics tend to found and attend catholic schools, their number
is obviously closely related to the number of catholic schools in the education market.
Exogeneity can be assumed because there is no reason to believe that catholics fare better
on standardized tests. Moreover, geographical areas where catholics dominate are largely
historically predetermined.
The rst stage results (table 5) indicate that both instruments are highly signicant and
that there is no problem with weak instruments. The second stage coecients (table 6)
are scaled down a bit compared with the OLS results and as is always the case with 2SLS
the standard errors increase signicantly, rendering the eect of competition insignicant
for non-roman-catholic schools. Hausman tests of statistical dierences in the OLS and
2SLS estimates, however, fail to reject exogeneity of the competition variable in both
cases. When it comes to instrument exogeneity, standard overidentication tests fail to
reject the exogeneity of the instruments at any reasonable level.
It should be noted however, that the overidentication tests do not carry much weight
here, as both instruments are derived from the same reasoning. Thus, in an alternative
specication shown in tables A-3 and A-4 in the appendix, the total length of the road
network within a municipality is used as an additional instrument. This instrument is
closely related to population size, which is used as an instrument for competition by



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15into account the accessibility of schools.18 Any urban/rural dierences in achievement
are tried to capture by controlling for population density and land area at the market
level. Population density should also not react to school quality, as it is not necessary to
physically move to the vicinity of the school of choice. The results from these alternative
2SLS estimations are virtually identical and the overidentication statistic is even smaller.
In the end, the 2SLS results indicate that we can have some condence in the validity of
the baseline OLS results.
Table 5: First stage statistics.
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
Catholics in municip. (1000s) 0:1071 (0:0112) 0:0643 (0:0166)
Cath in municip. squared  0:0007 (0:0001)  0:0003 (0:0002)
F-test excluded instr. F(2,140)=58.36 F(2,153)=15.63
p=0.000 p=0.000
partial R2 excluded instr. 0.61 0.41
R2 0.83 0.66
N 542 616
Estimates are for 1st stage of 2SLS. Number of schools is the dependent variable of 1st stage. Estimates shown for the
excluded instruments only. Control variables are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in
parentheses allow for clustering by municipality.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
4.2 Robustness checks
Table 7 displays results for some alternative specications. In all of these, the dependent
variable is the central exam grade. The top part (a) of the table shows that the eect
of catholic competition on public schools is somewhat larger than for all non-catholic
schools. This is intuitively consistent with the nding that non-religious schools are the
worst schools among the non-catholic schools.
Because there may be urban/rural dierences in the eects of competition and because
catholic competition might not have as much of an eect in predominantly catholic dioce-
ses, part (b) of the table shows how sensitive the results are to dropping these schools from
the sample.19 While dropping the grote 4 (big 4) cities Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam
and Den Haag slightly reduces the competition eects, the impact of catholic alternatives
seems to be especially large in those dioceses that are not predominantly catholic. The
eect of catholic competition seems to be largest in non-catholic areas outside the grote
4.
An important question is whether the eect of competition is truly an eect that can
18Gibbons and Olmo (2006) nd that academic achievement is higher in urban areas of the UK. This could
cast doubt on the assumption of exogeneity. However, they expressly attribute this eect to higher levels
of competition.
19The dioceses of Roermond, Breda and Den Bosch are classied as predominantly catholic dioceses because
the share of catholics in the population is above 40% in all three.
16Table 6: 2SLS, dependent variable is central exam grade.
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
(Partly) catholic schools 0:2434 (0:127)
Roman catholic schools 0:1700 (0:155)
Above advice %  0:0456 (0:011)  0:0473 (0:010)
Half above advice %  0:0136 (0:008)  0:0157 (0:008)
Minority (cumi) students %  0:0831 (0:020)  0:0915 (0:017)
Study cost recipients %  0:0384 (0:019)  0:0289 (0:018)
Tracked in grade 1 % 0:0111 (0:004) 0:0083 (0:004)
Tracked in grade 2 %  0:0007 (0:004) 0:0002 (0:004)
Class size grade 1 0:1466 (0:048) 0:1413 (0:045)
Class size grade 2  0:0101 (0:050)  0:0233 (0:052)
Non-religious school dummy  0:6707 (0:264)  0:4278 (0:244)
Number of students VWO (1000s) 0:0414 (1:182) 0:0869 (1:247)
Number of students brin (1000s)  0:0055 (0:121)  0:0147 (0:119)
Quality of life  0:0757 (0:146)  0:1381 (0:140)
Average income (1000 Euro)  0:1818 (0:138)  0:2497 (0:135)
Population share school aged 0:0748 (0:075) 0:0557 (0:063)
Pop. density (1000/km2)  0:0507 (0:097) 0:0221 (0:087)
Land area (km2)  0:0008 (0:001) 0:0000 (0:001)
Year 2003 0:4060 (0:137) 0:3859 (0:137)
Intercept 64:3534 (2:741) 65:6897 (2:627)
N 542 616
adj. R2 0.325 0.306
test of overid. restr. 2(1) 0:010 (p = 0:920) 0:145 (p = 0:703)
Second stage estimates, instruments are the number of catholics in the municipality and its square. All schools that are at
least in part catholic schools count towards the competition variable in column (1), whereas only roman-catholic schools
are considered in column (2). Control variables are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors
in parentheses allow for clustering on the municipality (gemeente) level.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
only be found when catholic schools are treated as the competitors. The bottom part (c)
of table 7 shows that the number of other schools than the catholic ones does not have
an impact on exam grades and that catholic competition does not improve the outcome
for other catholic schools. These estimates are in line with the assumption of this paper
that competition in the Netherlands is mainly inter-denominational and aects the non-
catholic schools
Other proxies for competition are employed in table 8. The number of schools within a
15km radius is signicant at the ten percent level. If it is in fact true that households
mostly choose schools that are located within their own gemeente, then the 15km radius
is an inappropriate specication as it will almost inevitably contain schools in other mu-
nicipalities. The same argument is true for distance to the nearest catholic school (not
signicant), as this will sometimes be the distance to a school outside the municipality.
In addition, a drawback of the data used is that all distances are calculated 'as the crow
ies', thus neglecting geographical obstacles such as rivers or bad connecting roads be-
tween places. The Herndahl measure of competition does not solely depend on catholic
school competition. Higher concentration is associated with lower average grades, yet the
coecient is signicant only in one of the 2SLS estimations. Even though the Herndahl
index comprises the shares of all schools in a market, it is still heavily inuenced by the
number of catholic schools in the market. Thus, the signicant coecient does not stand
17Table 7: Robustness checks, dependent variable exam grade.
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
(a) catholic competition, eect on public schools
Number of catholic schools in muni. 0:3723 (0:129)
Number of rom.-cath. schools in muni. 0:3353 (0:137)
(b) catholic competition (# cat schools), sub-samples
Catholic, w/out big 4 cities 0:2494 (0:108)
Rom.-cath., w/out big 4 cities 0:2020 (0:111)
Catholic, w/out cath. dioceses 0:3409 (0:087)
Rom.-cath., w/out cath. dioceses 0:3027 (0:094)
Catholic, w/out big 4 and cath. dioc. 0:3711 (0:141)
Rom.-cath., w/out big 4 and cath. dioc. 0:3595 (0:159)
(c) other forms of competition, placebo regressions
All competitors on all schools 0.0293 (0.036)
All competitors on non-cat. schools 0.0461 (0.047)
All competitors on non-rom.-cat. schools 0.0380 (0.043)
Cat. competitors on cat. schools -0.0034 (0.118)
R.-cat. competitors on rom.-cat. schools 0.0119 (0.146)
Non-cat. competitors on all schools -0.0049 (0.046)
Non-rom.-cat. comp. on all schools 0.0080 (0.041)
Non-cat. competitors on non-cath schools 0.0174 (0.059)
Non-rom.-cat. comp. on non-rom.-cath. sch. 0.0192 (0.050)
Non-cat. competitors on cath. schools -0.0835 (0.077)
Non-rom.-cat. comp. on rom.-cath. schools -0.0245 (0.095)
Part (a) shows the eect of 'number of catholic/roman-catholic schools in municipality' on central exam grades in public
schools. Part (b) shows the coecients of the variable 'number of catholic/ roman-catholic schools in municipality'. The
bottom part (c) shows coecients for other forms of competition that are not believed to have an eect on academic
achievment. Where applicable, all schools that are at least in part catholic schools count towards the competition variable
in column (1), whereas only roman-catholic schools are considered in column (2). Only coecients of the competition
variable are displayed. Control variables are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in
parentheses allow for clustering on the municipality (gemeente) level.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
against the hypothesis that catholic schools are the real competition. Quite the contrary,
the eect should be reduced in comparison to a competition measure that considers only
catholic schools. Taken together, the rather weak results for the alternative competi-
tion measures provide some support for treating the municipalities as separate education
markets.
4.3 Alternative outcome variables
Two alternative outcomes of competition are considered in this section. When it comes to
per-student spending, there is clearly no eect to be found.20 More interesting results are
20The only signicant eect is found for the distance measure. The farther the nearest catholic school is
away, the more money non-catholic schools spend per student. Since the distance measure did not have
an eect on exam grades, an interpretation of this result is hard to come up with. In addition, the per




Cath. schools w/in 15km 0:075 (0:037)
km to nearest catholic school 0:004 (0:021)
Roman-cath. schools w/in 15km 0:075 (0:047)
km to nearest rom.-cath. school  0:007 (0:008)
Herndahl enrolment  0:685 (0:572)  0:385 (0:535)
2SLS estimates
Cath. schools w/in 15km 0:137 (0:075)
km to nearest catholic school  0:057 (0:038)
Roman-cath. schools w/in 15km 0:079 (0:082)
km to nearest rom.-cath. school  0:011 (0:015)
Herndahl enrolment  1:719 (1:020)  0:774 (1:068)
OLS estimates in upper half, second stage 2SLS estimates in bottom part of table. Instruments are the number of
catholics in the municipality and its square. All schools that are at least in part catholic schools count towards the
competition variable in column (1), whereas only roman-catholic schools are considered in column (2). Control variables
are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the
municipality (gemeente) level.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
obtained for the eect of competition on grade ination. As stated above, theory suggests
that under competitive pressure, schools will tend to award higher schoolexamen-grades in
order to attract students. Somewhat puzzling is the fact that OLS results show that higher
levels of competition actually induce lower levels of grade ination.21 The magnitude of
the eect is similar to the eect on central grades: a one standard deviation shift in
competition lowers grade ination by 0.1 standard deviations. In light of the nding that
competition increases the central exam grades, this means that obviously schools do not
react to competition by inating local school grades by the same amount.
This section so far has provided some tentative evidence that competition may not be so
detrimental after all, not even when it comes to grade ination.
5 Distributional Analysis { QR and IVQR
Whenever competition in the education sector is discussed, a major concern is that the
consequences of choice may be very dierent at dierent points of the achievement distri-
bution. Specically, it is often argued, that the best schools will be able to lure the most
able students away from the badly performing schools. When this is the case, positive
eects of competition on the mean school may still be observed, that is, the average eect
of competition may be benecial. At the same time, it may be the case that the eects of
student spending data is available for only roughly half of the schools.
212SLS results are not reported, since Hausman tests again fail to reject exogeneity of the competition
variable.
19Table 9: Alternative outcome measures.
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
catholic competition, eect on grade ination
Number of catholic schools in muni.  0:1695 (0:0899)
Number of rom.-cath. schools in muni.  0:1601 (0:0952)
N 542 616
catholic competition, eect on per student spending
Number of catholic schools in muni.  1:8138 (46:3016)
Number of rom.-cath. schools in muni. 16:1708 (61:8937)
N 252 288
estimates of the eect of 'number of catholic/roman-catholic schools in municipality' on grade ination and per student
spending. Control variables are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in parentheses allow
for clustering by municipality.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
competition are actually negative for the underachieving schools because they lose their
most able students to the 'elite' schools at the upper tail of the achievement distribution
for whom the eects of competition would then be positive. Thus, the results presented in
the previous section are misleading, whenever the eect varies across the distribution. A
tool that is very useful in this context is quantile regression (QR), as proposed by Koenker
and Bassett (1978). In general notation, it allows the calculation of the -th quantile of
a dependent variable Y given the independent variables X by solving:
() = argmin

E[(Y   X)]; (5)
where  is the 'check function' or 'loss function' given by:
(") = [   1(" < 0)]"; (6)
and " = (Y   X). The check function thus generates asymmetrically weighted absolute
residuals. The  that minimizes equation (5) contains the parameters of interest for
quantile .
A quantile regression in the context of this paper can be written in the form of a random
coecients model. The eect of competition on academic achievement in the presence of
heterogenous eects across the distribution of the outcome variable can then be repre-
sented by the following estimation equation:
20Gij = (U)Cij + Xi(U) + Zj(U) + "ij(U); (7)
where { as dened earlier in the paper { Gij are academic outcomes, Cij is the measure
of competition and Xi as well as Zj are vectors of control variables.22 In the spirit of
Doksum (1974), the rank term U can be interpreted as unobserved, innate ability or
proneness (in this context, e.g. proneness to learn). Unobserved ability is normalized to
be uniformly distributed and thus represent the rank of the individuals when it comes to
ability: UjC;Xi;Zj  Uniform(0;1). Individuals with the same observable characteris-
tics will exhibit heterogenous outcomes whenever their rank in U diers. The use of QR
can thus be interpreted as accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
While QR has become increasingly popular in the recent past (perhaps due to its now
wide availability in commonly used statistics packages), conventional QR suers from
the same problems as OLS whenever endogeneity is present. That is, equation (7) gives
unbiased results only if competition is not determined together with U. As has been
laid out earlier, it is not unlikely that Cij may be statistically dependent on U. This
means that even though in the previous sections of this paper, 2SLS estimates did not
point to any endogeneity issues at the mean, things may be dierent at other quantiles.
As endogeneity problems can be countered through the use of instrumental variables in
regular OLS situations, intuitively the question of whether IV methods can be applied
to QR comes to mind. Indeed, a method of coping with endogeneity in the context of
QR has been suggested and further developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006,
2007 and 2008) and has been dubbed instrumental variable quantile regression or inverse
quantile regression (IVQR).23
Again using the random coecients model from equation (7), the assumptions underlying
the IVQR model are:
(a1) (U)Cij + Xi(U) + Zj(U) is strictly increasing in U.
(a2) UjXi;Zj;Iij  Uniform(0;1). U is independent of Xi;Zj and the instruments Iij
which are excluded from the structural equation (7) (where I consists of at least as
many instruments as there are endogenous variables, dim(I)  dim(C)). In what
follows, it is possible to plug in the instruments themselves into the regressions.
Alternatively, one can run a 'rst stage', where similar to 2SLS, the endogenous
variable is linearly projected onto the exogenous variables plus the excluded instru-
ments. The predicted values of the endogenous variable then make up Iij. The
latter approach is chosen for the estimations in this paper.
(a3) Rank invariance or rank similarity: Under each realization of the endogenous vari-
able Cij, an observation's rank would stay the same or change only in terms of
22The corresponding xed coecients model with additive disturbances can be written as: Gij = Cij +
Xi + Zj + "ij(U):
23IVQR has not yet been implemented in any statistics packages, yet the MATLAB code is kindly provided
by Chris Hansen on his website.
21random slippages.
From the structural equation (7) and the monotonicity assumption (a1) it can be seen
that Gij  ()Cij+Xi()+Zj() is equivalent to U   where  denotes the quantile
of interest. Considering (a1) and (a2), it then follows that
P[Gij  QG(jCij;Xi;Zj)jXi;Zj;Iij] = ; 24 (8)
which is equivalent to
P[Gij  ()Cij + Xi() + Zj()jXi;Zj;Iij] = : (9)
This moment condition is what Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006) call the main
implication of the model. Equation (9) essentially states that the -th quantile of the
random variable Gij   ()Cij   Xi()   Zj() given Xi;Zj;Iij is equal to zero.
The coecients ,  and most importantly  should then equal zero in the following
quantile regression:
Gij   ()Cij   Xi()   Zj() = Xi
() + Zj
() + Iij(); (10)
Since () in equation (10) is unknown, an b () must be chosen so that it minimizes the
distance of  from zero. For a nite sample size n this can be evaluated using a Wald
statistic Wn() and the coecient b () can be chosen accordingly:




(b (;); b (;); b (;)) = arg inf
(;;)
QG;n(;;;;) (12)
and A is a grid of potential values for , Wn() = n(b (;))0c M()(b (;)) and M() is
24The conditional quantiles QG(jCij;Xi;Zj) = ()Cij +Xi()+Zj() of the structural QR equation
suer from endogeneity bias. Thus, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) dene the structural quantile
function (SQF) as SG(jcij;xi;zj) = ()cij + xi() + zj(); where the lowercase variables denote
realizations of the random variables dened above. The SQF gives the latent outcome Gij when the
endogenous variable Cij is xed at a certain level and the disturbance is sampled independent of Cij.
Because of the endogeneity of competition, the SQF is a dierent function than the regular conditional
quantile function QG(jCij;Xi;Zj) that can be derived analogous to equation (5). In the presence of
endogeneity however, SG(jcij;xi;zj) cannot be directly estimated via a QR because the outcomes are
latent, however the use of suitable instruments can overcome this limitation. In order to keep the notation
simple, we will not discriminate between QG and SG.
22the inverse of the asymptotic variance
p
n(b ()   ()). Wn() then becomes the Wald
statistic for testing (;) = 0. Estimates for the parameters can then be written as
(b (); b (); b ()) = (b (); b (b ();); b (b ();)).
To nd a practical way of estimating the IVQR model, consider that equation (10) can
be stated as:
Gij   ()Cij = Xi(() + 
()) + Zj(() + 
()) + Iij(); (13)
with (() + ()) = () and (() + ()) = (). In practice, the rst step of
IVQR consists of running the -quantile regression of Gij   Cij on Xi;Zj and Iij for a
given grid of values of , thus obtaining the coecients (;);(;) and (;). In a
second step, the b () is chosen which minimizes Wn(). The coecients of b ();b () are
then implied by b (b (););b (b ();).
In what follows, estimates for the eect of competition on educational achievement and
grade ination are presented for the 5th to the 95th quantile (in steps of 5) using both
QR and IVQR.
5.1 QR and IVQR estimates
The main results of both QR and IVQR are summarized in table 10 while gures 1 and
2 visualize the results.
The conventional QR results suggest that the eects of competition are positive for all
schools except for those at the top of the grade distribution. These estimates are sta-
tistically signicant for all but the 5th quantile and the top two deciles. Thus, contrary
to what one might expect, it does not seem that the schools at the bottom of the grade
distribution suer from cream skimming by the schools at the top of the grade distribu-
tion and the IVQR results do nothing to change this impression. The IVQR estimates
are mostly in the range of what QR suggests and { as is to be expected { standard errors
are somewhat inated.
From the QR results, competition seems to have the smallest restraining eect on grade
ination in the bottom part of the distribution of grade ination. That is, schools which
already practice little grade ination25 do not react to competition by raising their local
grading standards. It is the middle part of the distribution, starting at the 35th quantile
that seems to react to competition by actually increasing their local grading standards.
Obviously, one would have hoped for schools at the top of the grade ination distribution
to raise their standards the most as a reaction to competition. Still, the result clearly
points out that schools that already practice heavy grade ination do not try and attract
25While there are a few schools that award lower school grades than central exam grades, the 5th percentile
already practices grade ination.
23students by further inating their grades in response to competitive pressure. Once again,
the IVQR results conrm the QR results.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the eect of competition among secondary schools on achievement
and grading standards in a setting that satises most of the criteria that are stipulated by
school choice proponents. The Dutch empirical evidence is in line with theoretical predic-
tions. Most of the empirical results support the notion of competition in the educational
sector yielding benecial results, i.e. leading to higher central exam scores while at the
same time exerting a restraining eect on grade ination. Competition in the Netherlands
appears to be driven by catholic schools, while the availability of non-catholic alterna-
tives doesn't seem to induce markedly higher educational attainment or lower levels of
grade ination.26 No evidence of endogeneity of competition could be found and quantile
regression results clear concerns that competition may be detrimental to schools at the
bottom of the grade distribution.
The placebo regressions suggest that sorting by ability and consequently peer eects is
not what's driving these results. Suppose that school choice leads to perfect segregation
by ability, i.e. all high-ability students leave for a catholic competitor. Those students
remaining in the public sector would then attain considerably lower grades than the former
mixed-ability student population. Then, using only non-catholic grades as the outcome
variable could lead to the assumption that competition leads to lower achievement when
this market is compared to one where no segregation occurs for lack of alternatives. Even
when a rich set of controls is used, one couldn't completely disentangle the eect of sorting
from the impact of competition. From the OLS results one could then hypothesize that
in the Netherlands, the less able students leave for catholic schools. From the placebo
regression results it seems, however, that catholic schools are not aected by competition
at all. Competition does not seem to aect catholic grades, thus the competition eect
net of sorting is supposedly still positive.
The bottom line of this paper is that competition as measured by the availability of
catholic schools in close proximity seems to have positive eects on educational achieve-
ment as well the setting of standards. The latter result runs counter the tempting as-
sumption that competition leads to a deterioration of standards { a claim that we can now
clearly discard, at least in the Dutch context. There is, however, a need to look deeper
into the mechanisms that drive the setting of standards at the local level. Also, so far
only competition in the pre-university branch of education has been considered. Hence,
it will be interesting to see whether these eects carry over to the lower school branches.
26Placebo regressions for the dependent variable grade ination are not reported. Just as in the case of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Figure 1: QR and IVQR estimates, central exam grades.
26Figure 2: QR and IVQR estimates, grade inflation.
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Appendix
Rotterdam, deelgemeenten. Shaded areas are the Rotterdam boroughs.
Source: Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek, Rotterdam
31Table A-1: Summary statistics, non-catholic schools.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Above advice % 575 22:22 17:95 0 100:00
Half above advice % 575 37:98 24:11 0 100:00
Minority (cumi) students % 616 5:44 9:82 0 78:94
Study cost recipients % 615 28:07 11:33 8:67 100:00
Tracked in grade 1 % 591 34:32 34:59 0 100:00
Tracked in grade 2 % 584 61:14 36:21 0 100:00
Class size grade 1 597 25:28 2:64 16:00 32:00
Class size grade 2 587 25:22 2:65 11:00 31:00
Non-religious school dummy 639 0:65 0:47 0 1:00
Number of students VWO (1000s) 620 241:05 117:10 6:00 785:00
Number of students brin (1000s) 614 1849:83 1104:02 97:00 5697:00
Short term debt % 538 32:23 11:18 0 86:80
Long term debt % 538 3:36 7:20 0 54:30
Sta growth % 608 2:84 5:70  25:50 30:50
Number of students growth % 608 1:88 5:02  16:20 27:60
Part time sta % 608 37:59 9:73 15:90 69:00
Quality of life 639 0:03 1:07  2:74 3:52
Average income (1000 Euro) 633 12:99 1:12 10:80 19:20
Population share school aged 638 17:67 1:82 13:90 24:00
Pop. density (1000/km2) 638 2:04 1:59 0:05 5:67
Land area (km2) 638 117:96 118:00 6:62 765:39
Number of catholics (1000s) 638 22:59 25:76 0:22 108:48
Table A-2: Summary statistics, non roman-catholic schools.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Above advice % 659 22:49 17:70 0 100:00
Half above advice % 659 38:16 24:03 0 100:00
Minority (cumi) students % 710 5:47 9:95 0 78:94
Study cost recipients % 708 28:18 11:77 8:67 100:00
Tracked in grade 1 % 683 33:74 34:13 0 100:00
Tracked in grade 2 % 675 61:31 35:90 0 100:00
Class size grade 1 689 25:24 2:66 16:00 32:00
Class size grade 2 678 25:20 2:62 11:00 301:00
Non-religious school dummy 733 0:57 0:49 0 1:00
Number of students VWO (1000s) 709 241:21 114:97 6:00 785:00
Number of students brin (1000s) 708 1857:34 1070:33 97:00 5697:00
Short term debt % 625 32:35 11:04 0 86:80
Long term debt % 625 3:49 7:50 0 54:30
Sta growth % 696 2:87 5:78  25:50 30:50
Number of students growth % 700 1:86 5:14  16:20 35:50
Part time sta % 696 37:31 9:55 15:90 69:00
Quality of life 733 0:06 1:08  2:74 3:52
Average income (1000 Euro) 721 12:98 1:12 10:80 19:20
Population share school aged 729 17:72 1:87 13:90 24:10
Pop. density (1000/km2) 729 1:99 1:58 0:05 5:67
Land area (km2) 729 118:78 119:92 6:62 765:39
Number of catholics (1000s) 729 22:85 25:20 0:22 108:48
32Table A-3: First stage statistics, additional instrument.
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
Catholics in municip. (1000s) 0:0921 (0:0101) 0:0513 (0:0170)
Cath in municip. squared  0:0006 (0:0001)  0:0003 (0:0002)
Road network (km) 0:0007 (0:0002) 0:0008 (0:0004)
F-test excluded instr. F(3,140)=47.84 F(3,153)=14.96
p=0.000 p=0.000
partial R2 excluded instr. 0.63 0.43
R2 0.83 0.66
N 542 616
Estimates are for 1st stage of 2SLS. Number of schools is the dependent variable of 1st stage. Estimates shown for the
excluded instruments only. Control variables are as in column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in
parentheses allow for clustering by municipality.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
Table A-4: 2SLS central exam, add'l instrument
(1) (2)
(Partly) catholic Roman-catholic
(Partly) catholic schools 0:2459 (0:133)
Roman catholic schools 0:1961 (0:166)
Above advice %  0:0456 (0:011)  0:0474 (0:010)
Half above advice %  0:0136 (0:008)  0:0156 (0:008)
Minority (cumi) students %  0:0832 (0:020)  0:0923 (0:017)
Study cost recipients %  0:0384 (0:019)  0:0288 (0:018)
Tracked in grade 1 % 0:0111 (0:004) 0:0083 (0:004)
Tracked in grade 2 %  0:0007 (0:004) 0:0002 (0:004)
Class size grade 1 0:1465 (0:047) 0:1403 (0:045)
Class size grade 2  0:0101 (0:050)  0:0230 (0:052)
Non-religious school dummy  0:6703 (0:266)  0:4265 (0:244)
Number of students VWO (1000s) 0:0379 (1:198) 0:0492 (1:266)
Number of students brin (1000s)  0:0052 (0:120)  0:0123 (0:118)
Quality of life  0:0759 (0:146)  0:1402 (0:140)
Average income (1000 Euro)  0:1819 (0:139)  0:2497 (0:135)
Population share school aged 0:0754 (0:076) 0:0607 (0:064)
Pop. density (1000/km2)  0:0516 (0:095) 0:0165 (0:085)
Land area (km2)  0:0008 (0:001)  0:0001 (0:001)
Year 2003 0:4062 (0:137) 0:3877 (0:136)
Intercept 64:3431 (2:761) 65:6149 (2:658)
N 542 616
adj. R2 0.325 0.306
test of overid. restr. 2(2) 0:016 (p = 0:992) 0:548 (p = 0:760)
Second stage estimates, instruments are the number of catholics in the municipality and its square and the length of the
road network in the municipality. All schools that are at least in part catholic schools count towards the competition
variable in column (1), whereas only roman-catholic schools are considered in column (2). Control variables are as in
column (3) of the baseline OLS tables 3 and 4. Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering on the municipality
(gemeente) level.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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